I underwrote a $350M tower in St. Louis.

They're seeking $8M to unlock $350M.

- 44-storey tower, downtown St. Louis
- Bought out of foreclosure for $3.6M
- Total project cost: $350M
- $175M covered by tax credits
- Converting to 631 luxury apartments
- $8M bridge: 13%, 12 months, I/O
- Exits into $150M construction loan

The sponsor bought a vacant 44-storey office tower for $3.6M, less than a quarter of its appraised value.

The plan is a full office-to-residential conversion, funded heavily by federal and state historic tax credits, C-PACE, and a newly passed Missouri bill unlocking $70M in conversion credits.

To fund deals like this, I ask 4 questions:

1) What stage of risk are we in?

- Property owned, with $4.77M equity
- Existing loan, clear payment history
- Permits and plans are in progress
- Construction start: mid-2027

2) What makes the location work?

- Downtown St. Louis (near the Stadium)
- Housing shortages & high office vacancy
- Missouri is subsidising office-to-residential

3) How is the downside protected?

- First position CREM at 54.79% LTV
- $14.6M appraisal vs $8M loan
- $6.6M collateral surplus
- $4.77M sponsor equity already in the ground

4) Can we control the exit?

- Bridge exits into a construction loan post-permit
- MO Bill 3231 passed May 2026 ($70M tax credits)

Liquidity is low, but the sponsor owns the building. $4.77M in equity shows 'skin in the game,' but a lender will still want to stress-test it.

The bridge refinances into a construction loan contingent on a $25-35M capital raise that hasn't happened yet.

My verdict:

- Strong fit for Bridge Lenders
- Strong fit for Family Offices
- Weak fit for Institutions

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